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THE CULTURE OF HEALTH CARE: HOW
PROFESSIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CULTURES IMPACT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
Debra Gerardi*
INTRODUCTION

"Culture matters. It matters because decisions made without
awareness of the operative cultural forces may have
unanticipatedand undesirable consequences.... The argument
for taking culture seriously, therefore, is that one should
anticipate consequences and make a choice about their
desirability."I

The expansion of alternative dispute resolution within the past 302
years, in both the public and private sectors, is well-documented.
However, despite this expansion, attempts to expand alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) and conflict management services into
health care organizations have had little success. 3 A 1997 survey of
Fortune 1000 companies that had adopted some form of
organizational conflict management strategy indicates that those
organizations experiencing high levels of market pressure were most
likely to adopt a preventive approach-use of ADR in all types of
disputes with a comprehensive set of policies designed to manage
conflict. 4 Given the intense market pressures within the health care
* Debra is the President and CEO of Health Care Mediations, Inc. providing conflict management
services to health care organizations internationally. She is also the director of the Program on
Healthcare Collaboration and Conflict Management at the Werner Institute for Negotiation and Dispute
Resolution at Creighton University School of Law.
Debra can be reached at
dgerardi@healthcaremediations.com.
1. EDGAR H. SCHEIN, THE CORPORATE CULTURE SURVIVAL GUIDE 3 (1999).
2. DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT:
LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS
75 (2003).
3. Harry N. Mazadoorian & Stephen R. Latham, ADR for Health Care Organizations,DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Fall 2004, at 8, 10.
4. LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 2.
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industry in the past 20 years, it is curious that the industry
has not
5
widely adopted effective conflict management strategies.
There is empirical evidence indicating a tight connection between6
organizational culture and conflict in health care organizations.
Review of corporate adoption of ADR approaches indicates that
resistance to organizational conflict management systems correlates
to organizational culture and views of conflict, to the "motives and
objectives of stakeholder groups," to the lack of analysis of existing
systems resulting in little data for decision-making, and to the
diminishing impact of a "precipitating event" or crisis over time as
the perceived threat recedes from organizational memory.7 In fact,
the cultural view of conflict and its impact on organizational
performance is an indicator of an organization's willingness to
develop conflict management systems. 8 This Article will begin to
outline how the interplay between organizational culture and the
cultures of health care professions may be a source of conflict within
complex health care organizations and how underlying cultural
assumptions may be affecting responsiveness to the efforts of dispute
resolution professionals in the industry to provide services for
addressing conflict.
Understanding organizational culture, how to assess culture, and
the ways cultural beliefs affect approaches to conflict management is
a relatively new field of study.9 Pettigrew first used the term
"organizational culture" in 1979, and a review of the literature
indicates that "organizational culture" has many definitions. 10 The
functions of organizational culture are: to "convey a sense of
identity" for members, to "facilitate commitment" to a larger goal, to
"enhance social systems' stability," and to provide a means for
making sense of the organizational environment in order to guide
5. Mazadoorian & Latham, supra note 3, at 9.
6. See Geoffirey Bloor & Patrick Dawson, Understanding ProfessionalCulture in Organizational
Context,
15
ORG.
STUD.
275
(1994),
available
at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mim4339/is-n2vl 5/ai_16043940/pg_ 1.
7. LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 300, 301, 307, 312.
8. LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 301.
9. TIM SCOTT ET AL., HEALTHCARE PERFORMANCE AND ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 130 (2003).

10. Id. at 1, 3.
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behavior." The study of organizational culture as a means for
understanding differences contributing to organizational effectiveness
began in the 1980s with studies analyzing quality differences
between U.S. and non-U.S. companies.' 2 These efforts led to
numerous models and approaches for how best to understand
organizational culture with the goal of effecting changes to the
culture that would move organizations toward more efficient and
effective performance.' 3 Areas of agreement among the various
theorists seem to point to the complexity of organizational culture,
the difficulty of assessing culture, and the consensus that "a basic
function of organizational culture is to stabilise and establish a way
14
of living. Resistance to change is therefore inherent to culture."
Given the stability of culture and the inherent resistance to change, it
is clear that factors that demand change, such as market conditions or
changes in public demands, can create an environment in which a
great deal of conflict develops as organizations implement changes
that may uncover competing values and beliefs held by members of
the organization and by its professional groups.
A little-researched area is the interplay between organizational
culture and the culture of professional groups working within the
organization.' 5 "The significance of professional identity and
orientation may be one key to help unlock the culture of health care
organisations."' 16 Professional subcultures transcend organizations
and professional associations, and continuous identification with
17
other members of the professional group reinforce them.
Specialized training, practice environments that reinforce group
norms, and limited inter-professional education lead to stable
subcultures that both help define and simultaneously resist the goals
11.

Id. at 18 (adapted from Linda Smircich, Concepts of Culture and OrganizationalAnalysis, 28

ADMIrN. Sci. Q. 339, 345-46 (1983)).

12. Id. at 14.
13. See id. at 58.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Pieter Degeling et al., Mediating the CulturalBoundariesBetween Medicine, Nursing
and Management-The Central Challenge in Hospital Reform, 14 HEALTH SERVICES MGMT. RES. 36
(2001).
16. SCOTT ET AL., supranote 9, at 22.
17. Id. at 22.
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set forth by the broader organizational culture.' 8 In health care,
establishment of group norms within subspecialty cultures divides
subcultures even further.19 A more detailed discussion of professional
subcultures within the health care system follows.
Dominant professional cultures can have a large impact on the
values and assumptions of the organization, and threats to dominance
can create conflicts among various professional groups that may not
share the same set of values. 20 Changes to the environment external
to the organization create opportunities for shifts in professional
dominance as* market pressures and societal expectations force
changes to organizational practices-changes that may threaten
21
deeply held beliefs among members of the dominant groups.
Conflicts arise when values and assumptions held by one group clash
with those of another group, and professional disputes over treatment
protocols, scope of practice, credentialing boundaries, and
supervisory authority reveal these conflicts. 22 These disputes may
impact the organization as other subgroups enter the conflict and as
the organization diverts resources toward managing the conflict's
impact. Disputes between professional groups and groups outside the
organization, such as consumers or public agencies, may also result
from differences in beliefs. In one study, researchers measured values
held by patients, residents, and faculty physicians and found that
there were values discrepancies between the groups, with the greatest
difference related to having the same doctor for more than one yearthe top priority for patients but a low priority for residents and faculty
physicians. 23 These researchers also described three different
conceptual metaphors for how each group saw their role during the
clinic visit. Patients described a clinic visit as "a series of locks," with
18. THERESA J. K. DRNKA & PHILLIP G. CLARK, HEALTH CARE TEAMWORK: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PRACTICE AND TEACHING 65-66 (2000); SCOTT ET AL., supra note 9, at 26.
19. SCOTT ET AL., supra note 9, at 25.

20. Bloor & Dawson, supra note 6.
21. Joseph S.Bujak, Culture in Chaos: The Needfor Leadership and Followershipin MedicineCompeting on the Edge, PHYSICIAN
EXECUTIVE,
May-June
1999,
available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articlesmi_mO8431is_3_251ai_1022743741pg__l.
22. DRINKA & CLARK, supra note 18, at 80; Degeling et al., supra note 15, at 46.
23. C. Scott Smith et al., Cultural ConsensusAnalysis as a Tool for Clinic Improvements, 19 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 514, 514-15 (2004).
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various stages for receiving care. 24 The residents used a "docket"
model, with the focus on efficiency and who controls the clinic
agenda for the day. 25 The faculty physicians sought "balance"
between ideal and realistic goals. 26
Addressing conflicts that involve differing values and assumptions
can be daunting and requires particular skills and processes that elicit
cultural beliefs by uncovering those unconscious assumptions that
motivate behavior among members of the professional groups,
among members of the organization at large, and among those who
seek their services. Current traditional and alternative dispute
resolution models are not sufficient. Finding and testing new models
for addressing these conflicts will require a greater understanding of
the role of organizational and professional cultures in health care
dispute resolution.
It is difficult for dispute resolution professionals outside of health
care to appreciate the complexity of health care culture and the types
of conflict that the clinical setting generates. Many ADR practitioners
express frustration at the obvious disconnect between the great need
for better conflict management within health care organizations and
the lack of responsiveness by the industry. A recent study indicates
that perceptions by ADR practitioners and physicians regarding
various aspects of conflict within health care are not aligned. In one
study, Coby Anderson and Linda D'Antonio demonstrated that the
two groups differ in their perceptions as to "the sources and amount
of conflict doctors experience, . . . [as to] what relationships doctors
deal with best, and . . . [as to] the optimal time and manner for

training doctors in conflict-resolution skills." 27 Improved assessment
of the needs of health care professionals may enhance access to
health care organizations and improve the effectiveness of services
offered.
24. Id.at 516.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Coby Anderson & Linda L. D'Antonio, EmpiricalInsights-Understanding the Unique Culture
of Health Care Conflict, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2004, at 15, 15 [hereinafter Empirical Insights]; see
also Coby J. Anderson, J.D. & Linda L. D'Antonio, Ph.D., A ParticipatoryApproach to Understanding
Conflict in Healthcare,21 GA. ST.U. L. REV. 817 (2005).
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Public calls for changes in the culture of health care to improve
safety and quality, and data indicating that the work environment of
health professionals is contentious and unhealthy, suggest that the
need for conflict management services is increasing.28 Given the
stability exhibited by professional cultures, it is likely that initiatives
that threaten established hierarchies and deeply ingrained beliefs will
meet with much resistance, even in the presence of rational data
supporting the changes. Appropriate conflict management services
that address the sources of the disputes and create safe environments
for making choices that improve care without destroying identity can
lessen the frustration, sense of loss, fear, and pain encountered by
health care professionals as these conflicts play out in day-to-day
clinical interactions.
An exploration of the culture of health care and its various
subcultures will provide insight into the sources of resistance by
health care professionals to dispute resolution services and can enable
development of better processes for managing and preventing health
care related conflicts. It may also assist in defining strategies for
inviting health care organizations to make use of conflict
management techniques that facilitate culture change and improve the
environments in which providers deliver health care.
I. THE CULTURE OF HEALTH CARE

Managing conflict requires an understanding of the context in
which the conflict occurs. A look at the evolution of the health care
system in the United States provides some context for a more detailed
examination of organizational culture and its professional
subcultures. Research conducted by W. Richard Scott and others
takes a broad look at the vast changes in the health care industry
28. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (2000)
[hereinafter To ERR Is HUMAN]. See generally Intimidation: Practitioners Speak Up About This
Unresolved Problem (Part1), ISMP MEDICAL SAFETY ALERT (Inst. for Safe Medication Practices,
Huntingdon Valley, Pa.), Mar. 11, 2004 [hereinafter Practitioners Speak Up], available at
http://www.ismp.org/MSAarticles/ntimidationPrint.htm; AM. ASSOC. OF CRITICAL-CARE NURSES,
AACN STANDARDS FOR ESTABLISHING AND SUSTAINING HEALTHY WORK ENVIRONMENTS (2005),
availableat http://www.aacn.org/aacn/pubpocy.nsf/Files/HWEStandards/$file/HWEStandards.pdf.
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occurring since the 1960s.
In analyzing these changes, the
researchers focused on "institutional actors, institutional logics, and
governance systems." 30 The 1960s brought about changes to a system
dominated by physician "cultural authority," in which the basic
assumptions within health care organizations were premised on
"quality of care, as defined by the physician." 31 Professional
autonomy over care delivery was the dominant value within the
industry until about 1965.32 During the 1960s, Medicare and
Medicaid legislation improved access to care, and there was a rapid
growth in the numbers of health care facilities and providers and a
growing movement toward specialization in medical care. 33 In fact,
by 1970, physicians practicing as general primary care practitioners
comprised only forty percent of total non-federally employed
physicians.34 These changes brought about a shift toward "equity of
access" as a driving value and an expanded role of the federal
government in the financing of health services. 35 Increased
complexity in financing and delivery of care led to fragmented
governance of health care organizations and conflicts associated with
competing demands from regulators, administrators, physicians, and
36
patients.
Increased access to services through public funding and insurance,
increased technology, and expanding numbers of service providers
led to increased costs and expenditures for health services.37 From the
early 1980s through the present, the industry focus has been on

29. W. Richard Scott, The Old Order Changeth: The Evolving World of Health Care Organizations,
in ADVANCES IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION THEORY 23, 36-39 (Stephen S. Mick & Mindy E.
Wyttenbach eds., 2003).
30. Id. at 26.
31. Id.at 35.
32. Id. at 35.
33. Id.at 35-36.
34. See American Medical Association, Physiciansin the UnitedStates and
Possessions by Selected Characteristics,at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2688.htm (Dec.
12, 2004).
35. Scott, supra note 29, at 36.
36. Id.at 37.
37. Drew Altman & Larry Levitt, The Sad History of Health Care Cost Containment as Told in One
Chart,
HEALTH
AFF.
WEB
EXCLUSIVES
(Jan.
23,
2002),
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.83v1.
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efficiency and cost containment.38 New structures for financing care,
such as HMOs; new structures for professional practice, such as
IPAs, PPOs, and multi-specialty groups; and new delivery structures,
such as integrated delivery systems, began to form in response to
market forces and increased competition within the industry.39 With
the heightened focus on efficiency and the need to comply with vast
regulatory requirements, the need for professional health care
administrators became increasingly important within organizations.
These changes caused the professional autonomy of physicians to
decrease, the political power of professional associations to diminish,
and health care as big business to emerge as the dominant model.4 °
In the past few years, quality of care, patient safety, and the
expanding role of the health care consumer have begun to emerge as
environmental forces that will likely effect the continued evolution of
the industry. 4 ' There is an expanding focus on consumer-based care,
in which consumers are more accountable for both financing and
managing their health services. 42 Increased access to health
information and to quality data and increased direct marketing by
pharmaceutical companies is fundamentally changing the relationship
between patients and their physicians.43 Rewards offered to
consumers who choose physicians who demonstrate better outcomes,
as measured by health plans and employer score cards, in exchange
for greater coverage of costs further demonstrates the power shift
accompanying these changes. Already, large employers offer
incentives for employees who choose providers who have agreed to

38. Scott, supra note 29, at 37.
39. David Mechanic, Managed Care and the Imperativefor a New ProfessionalEthic, 19 HEALTH
AFF. 100 (2000), available at http://content.healthaffairs.orgcgi/reprint/19/5/100.pdf.
40. Scott, supra note 29, at 38-39.
41. Kenneth W. Kizer, Patient Safety: A Call to Action: A Consensus Statementfrom the National
Quality
Forum,
3
MEDSCAPE
GEN.
MED.
I
(Mar.
21,
2001),
at
http:l/www.medscape.com/viewarticle/408114; Practitioners Speak Up, supra note 28; Bujak, supra
note 21, at 2.
42. Fact File: Consumers in the Driver'sSeat?, HEALTHLEADERS MAG., Apr. 1, 2004, availableat
http://www.healthleaders.com/magazinelfactfile5388 I.html.
43. Kent Bottles, The Effect on the Information Revolution on American Medical Schools, 1
MEDSCAPE GEN. MED. 2 (July 23, 1999), at http.//www.medscape.com/viewarticle/407991.
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practice according to designated clinical practice guidelines. 44
Furthermore, as Medicare's pilot pay-for-performance model of
reimbursement expands throughout the industry, even more emphasis
will be on quality as determined by prescribed public standards.4 5
The tug of war between cost cutting and quality that is inherent in
a market-driven system creates systemic conflicts that impact the
work environment within health care organizations. Descriptions of
the current work environment and levels of satisfaction of health
professionals offer some insight into the extent to which conflict is a
day-to-day occurrence for many practitioners. Research indicates that
50% of physicians' daily practice involves dealing with conflictsmostly with other physicians and administrators. a6 In a study by
Lynda Beaudoin and Linda Edgar, environmental and social
"hassles" had an impact on the work-life of nurses because they
divert time from patient care to search for equipment, to perform
housekeeping functions, to call for missing medications, to
coordinate scheduling, and to handle other non-direct care
functions. 47 The results of cutbacks in staffing have shifted nonnursing responsibilities to bedside nurses leading to feelings of
frustration, burnout, and stress and, in turn, to increased turnover. A
1996 survey of 600 hospitals indicated that 86% reported staff morale
to be a serious problem. 4 For nurses, unit culture impacts quality of

44. Arnie Milstein, M.D., Breaking News from the Pay-4-Performance Movement: Purchasers
Provide a Roadmap for Market Success, Remarks at the Sixth Annual National Patient Safety
Foundation Patient Safety Congress (May 5, 2004) (noting that Boeing will pay 100% for services if the
employee's hospital participates in The Leapfrog Group, an organization that seeks to use the market to
reduce medical errors); WHSA Board Adopts Patient Safety Project, WEEKLY REPORT (Wash. State
Hosp.
Ass'n,
Seattle,
Wash.),
July
23,
2004,
available
at
http'//www.wsha.org/ArchiveWeeklyReports/07-23-04.htm; Hospital Safety Incentive for Boeing,
Regence Blue Shield, at http://www.wa.regence.com/boeing/traditional/benefitlncentive (last visited
July 13, 2005).
45. See Jeff Tieman, Experimenting with Quality: CMS-Premier Initiative to Reward Best, Punish
Worst. MODERN HEALTHCARE,
July 14, 2003, at 6; HQI Overview, Premier, at
http://www.premierinc.com/all/quality/hqi/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2005).
46. EmpiricalInsights, supra note 27, at 16.
47. Lynda Egglefield Beaudoin & Linda Edgar, Hassles: Their Importance to Nurses' Quality of
WorkLife, 21 NURSING EcON. 106, (2003), availableat http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/457087.
48. Blair D. Gifford et al., The Relationship Between Hospital Unit Culture and Nurses' Quality of
Work Life, J. HEALTHCARE MGMT., Jan-Feb 2002, at 13.
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work life, which correlates to retention of staff.4 9 Physician
satisfaction with residency programs is linked to the clinical
environment and how well the residents work together as a team.5 °
Programs and policies for addressing "disruptive behavior" are
common, and recent surveys indicate that approaches for dealing with
outbursts are inconsistently effective. 5 1 Evidence of intimidation,
verbal abuse, and breakdowns in teamwork and communication
indicate that cracks in the organizational environment are impacting
the ability of health care professionals to deliver safe and effective
care. 52 In fact, breakdowns in interpersonal communication cause
60% of all sentinel events.53 In response to the increased literature
supporting the need for healthy work environments, the Association
for Critical Care Nurses has recently released Standards for Healthy
Work Environments to begin addressing the sources of conflict
54
present in organizations throughout the country.
In the presence of a scarcity of resources and major shifts in
power, many disputes within health care organizations take on lifeor-death significance as administrators fight to maintain financial
viability, as clinicians fight to retain autonomy and control over
quality of care, and as consumers demand high quality and access to
an ever-expanding menu of treatment options. The heart of these
disputes may be more than just financial concern and powerbrokering; it may be that changes in the health care environment are
49. Id.
50. Francis S. Nuthalapaty et al., The Influence of Quality-of-Life, Academic, and Workplace Factors
on Residency ProgramSelection, 79 ACAD. MED. 417, 417 (2004).
51. David 0. Weber, Poll Results: Doctor's Disruptive Behavior Disturbs Physician Leaders,
PHYSICIAN
EXECUTIVE,
Sept.-Oct.
2004,
at
6,
available
at
http://www.acpe.org/pej_article/disruptivebehavior weber.pdf.
52. PractitionersSpeak Up, supra note 28; Janice K. Cook et al., Exploring the Impact of Physician
Verbal Abuse on PreoperativeNurses, 74 ASSOC. OPERATING RoOM NURSES J. 317 (2001); INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE, KEEPING PATIENTS SAFE: TRANSFORMING THE WORK ENVIRONMENT OF NURSES 215-16

(2004), availableat http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309090679/html/.
53. Sentinel Event Statistics: Root Causes of Sentinel Events (All Categories; 1995-2004), Joint
Commission
on
Accreditation
of
Healthcare
Organizations,
at
http://www.jcaho.com/accredited+organizations/ambulatory+care/sentinel+events/root+causes+of+senti
nel+event.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Sentinel Event Statistics].
54. AM. AssOc. OF CRITICAL-CARE NURSES, AACN STANDARDS FOR ESTABLISHING AND
SUSTAINING HEALTHY WORK ENVIRONMENTS: A JOURNEY TO EXCELLENCE 4 (2005), available at

http://www.aacn.org/aacn/pubpolcy.ns f/Files/HWEStandards/$file/HWEStandards.pdf.
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triggering threats to the core beliefs forming the foundation of the
professional cultures that practice within health care organizations.
II. LEVELS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
An organization is fundamentally an "ongoing conversation"
among those who come into contact with it, and organizational
culture forms much of the nonverbal component of that
conversation. 55 One can describe organizational culture on three
levels: "artifacts" (visible behaviors and structures), "espoused
values" (mission, strategies, philosophies), and "basic underlying
assumptions" ("unconscious. . . beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and
feelings").56 When behaviors occur that seem contrary to stated
values, conflicts can arise as individuals struggle to make sense of the
environment and the disconnect between what is indicated to be of
importance and what is actually reinforced through organizational
behavior. This disconnect indicates that deeper assumptions motivate
behaviors and that these assumptions may be contrary to the stated
values put forward by the group or organization and may be of more
significance to the individual.57 To the extent that these assumptions
are part of identity, they serve as a strong driver of behavior, may be
difficult to uncover, and can serve as a major barrier to behavioral
changes. 58 A look at each of these layers can help paint the picture of
the culture of health care and its professional subcultures.
A. Artifacts
Artifacts are the more visible components of group culture. 59 They
include such things as uniforms, work hours, staffing levels,
communication patterns, jargon, making decisions, level of formality,
Anthony L. Suchman, The Influence of Health Care Organizationson Well-Being, 174 W. J.
43 (2001).
SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 15-20.
Id. at 19.
58. ScoTr ET AL., supra note 9, at 36-37; JAY ROTHMAN, RESOLVING IDENTITY-BASED CONFLICT IN

55.
MED.
56.
57.

NATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNITIES 6 (1997).

59. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 15-16.
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and running meetings. 60 Artifacts are typically observable and can
frequently be the focus for disputes. For example, there has been
much debate about the appropriate number of work hours for medical
residents and in July 2003, the Accreditation Council of American
Graduate Education issued new standards for residency programs
limiting work hours for all specialties to eighty hours per week. 6 '
Conflicts result as hospitals reallocate work loads, as surgical training
programs modify established practices, and as faculty struggle with
creative solutions for meeting strict criteria in an unpredictable
environment. 62 Another example is the debate over whether the law
should mandate, or health care organizations determine, appropriate
nurse-to-patient staffing ratios. 63 Conflicts associated with
communication patterns within clinical teams provide a third
example. Recent evidence links breakdowns in communication and
teamwork-particularly inappropriate "hierarchy and intimidation"-to
serious harm and death to newboms. 64 Disputes at the level of
artifacts, despite serving as a focal point for conflicts, may not reflect
the cause of the conflict; they may merely be a symptom of a deeper
clash between values and assumptions as seen below.
B. Espoused Values
Espoused values are those philosophies or goals found in mission
statements, professional oaths, or offered as principles in which an
organization or group believes. 65 These may reflect deeper
assumptions, or they may come to be superficial rationales for group
60. Id.
61. ACGME Duty Hours Standards Fact Sheet, Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical
Education, at http://www.acgme.orglacWebsite/newsRoomnewsRmdutyHours.asp (last visited Apr.
16, 2005).
62. Michael Romano, Lightening Their Load: As Teaching Hospitals Grapple with New Rules
Limiting Residents' Hours on the Job, Cost and Management Issues Remain Among the Challenges,
at
2003,
available
Apr.
28,
MODERN
HEALTHCARE,
httpJ/www.modemhealthcare.com/article.cms?articleld=29242
63. Barbara Tone, What Works?: Nurse-PatientRatios, Professionalism, and Safety, NURSEWEEK,
May 3, 1999, available at http://www.nurseweek.com/features/99-5/ratios.html.
64. Preventing Infant Death and Injury During Delivery, SENTINEL EVENT ALERT (Joint
, available at
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., Oakbrook Terrace, Ill.),
http'/www.jcaho.org/about+ustnews+letters/sentinel+event+alert/print/sea_30.htm.
65. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 17.
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behaviors. 66 When espoused values are the justification for practices
and behaviors, language such as "that is the way we do things around
here" or "we have always done it that way" reflect the values.67
Espoused values in health care include patient-centeredness,
teamwork, quality care, safety, and patient advocacy. Many health
care organizations and health care professionals hold and put forth
these values. Yet for all the similarity in espoused values across
health care organizations, it is clear that culture in various
organizations can be quite different and that there are different levels
of consistency between stated values and observed behaviors. For
example, organizational practices related to visiting hours and
appointment scheduling can vary greatly, and these differences
believes or merely
provide insight into whether the organization
68
"patient-centeredness.,
of
value
the
promotes
C. Assumptions
Assumptions held by members of an organization manifest in
observable artifacts and behaviors. Assumptions are often unspoken
and may "drop from consciousness" over time as they become more
deeply integrated and reinforced by others who hold the same
assumptions.69 Within organizations, assumptions form when "joint
learning" leads to workable solutions that are passed on to new
members who enter the organization and that become the accepted
way of doing things.7 ° Shared assumptions lead to more consistent
behaviors among members of an organization where varying
assumptions lead to multiple approaches or ways of working. When
there are differences, conflicts may result that potentially damage
working relationships. It is necessary to have processes to deal with
these differences in order to restore effective working relationships
66. ScoTr ET AL., supra note 9, at 17-19 (citing SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 64).
67.

SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 76.

68. Don Berwick, Don Berwick's Challenge: Eliminate Restrictions on Visiting Hours in the
at
Healthcare
Improvement,
Institute
for
Care
Unit,
Intensive
http://www.ihi.org/IHI/Topics/Improvement/ImprTovementMethodsLiterature/DonBerwicksChallengeE
iminateRestrictionsonVisitingHoursintheIntensiveCareUnit.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2005).
69. SCOTT ET AL., supra note 9, at 64.
70. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 20.

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:857

that enable interdependent groups to negotiate their daily
71
interactions.
Deeply held assumptions can underlie various components of work
life including the design of systems and processes, the measurement
and correction of errors, "group boundaries and identity," "allocation
of rewards and status," and "the nature of authority and
relationships. 72 Because medical errors can lead to large and
protracted disputes, it is worth looking at some assumptions
underlying error reporting and correction in health care organizations.
Underlying assumptions impact the way organizations measure and
correct errors, as demonstrated by the current push to encourage
better reporting of errors and near misses by hospital employees and
physicians and by the recommended shift to a systems-based analysis
of health care delivery failures. 73 Numerous documents show that
there are a great deal of preventable deaths and injuries to patients
due to medical treatment and that situations leading to this harm are
often related to longstanding system failures that key stakeholders
knew of but did not report-sometimes repeatedly.74 This
phenomenon, documented within health care organizations across
several countries, indicates that financing systems, legal systems, and
national culture may be less of a factor than the culture of health care
itself:
It is striking that the causes and characteristics of major failures
in different countries with different ways of organizing and
funding health care are remarkably similar. This may suggest
that the problems-and their potential solutions-are deeply

71.

ROGER FISHER & SCOTr BROWN, GETTING TOGETHER: BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS AS WE

NEGOTIATE 132-33 (1988).
72. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 30.
73. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 78-80 (2001) [hereinafter CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM], available at
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309072808/htmiRl.html. A systems-based analysis of error involves
looking at all of the contributors to an error rather than focusing on the actions of a single individual or
group.
74. Kieran Walshe & Stephen M. Shortell, When Things Go Wrong: How Health Care
OrganizationsDeal With Major Failures,23 HEALTH AFF. 103, 105 (2004).
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embedded in the nature of clinical practice, the health care
professions, and the culture of health care organizations.75
Recent work by national patient safety organizations suggests that
moving from a model of individual causation to a systems-based
approach for correcting unsafe practices would lead to improved
safety and would remove barriers to self-reporting of events that
could lead to future harm.76 However, use of error correction
systems-such as root cause analysis or systems analysis, which seek
to avoid personal blame-are not successful in cultures valuing
competition and where employees actively pursue active avoidance
of personal blame. 77 Despite integration of root cause analysis as a
response to sentinel events since 1995, physicians may still mistrust
the process due to continued actions by the organization or their peers
78
that reinforce the deeper assumption that someone is to blame.
Additionally, performance improvement plans resulting from root
cause analysis often focus on re-education of the clinicians and
reinforcement of the policies as acceptable means for preventing
recurrences. This response further reinforces individual responsibility
for adverse events. Building trust and reinforcing teamwork are
necessary before a move toward system-based error analysis can be
effective.7 9 Building trust and teamwork within health care cultures
where there is "endemic secrecy, deference to authority,
defensiveness, and protectionism" and where excessive objectivity
constrains authenticity and increases interpersonal distancing will be
difficult and will require interventions that help to uncover
underlying assumptions, enabling those who hold them and those
80
who they affect to fully appreciate their impact.

75. Id. at 108.
76. CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 73, at 78-79.
77. SCHEIN, supranote 1, at 40.

78. Sentinel Event Statistics, supra note 53. In a 2002 root cause analysis facilitated by the author, a
senior physician began the meeting by presenting phone records of pages received by a resident assigned
to the patient involved in the sentinel event and by stating, "I have brought evidence that this doctor is
not to blame for the event, and she never received any of the pages alleged to have been made."
79. SCHEIN, supranote 1, at 40.
80. Walshe & Shortell, supranote 74, at 110; Suchman, supranote 55, at 44.
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III. A LOOK AT PROFESSIONAL SUBCULTURES
Structurally, health care organizations are complex adaptive
8
systems that have evolved from professional organizations. 1
Professional organizations' characteristics include: a public mandate
for the services, highly skilled and educated practitioners, strong
values, and a desire to provide services for the well being of society
as a whole.8 2 Within these bureaucracies, dominant coalitions form
with membership tied to professional affiliation, the level of
expertise, and the acceptance of the profession's values. 83 As health
care has become more technical and complex, health care
organizations have taken on the characteristics of complex adaptive
systems.8 4 As such, the importance of hierarchies, predictability, and
uniformity disappear, and success comes from strong networks and
relationships across various levels, from "sense-making," and from
"loose coupling." 85 To be successful, these organizations must foster
effective working relationships across the professions, between
departments, and throughout affiliated facilities.
Complex organizations commonly contain many subcultures, each
86
with its own set of tacit assumptions. Within professional groups,
socialization into the profession passes on assumptions and values.
The values represent meaning and become the basis for formation of
professional identity. Artifacts representing these values include use
of specialized language, adherence to professional hierarchy,
appropriate dress, and adoption of accepted approaches toward
problem-solving and communication. In health care, each

81. Ruth A. Anderson & Reuben R. McDaniel, Jr., Managing Healthcare Organizations: Where
ProfessionalismMeets Complexity Science, HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV., Winter 2000, at 83, 86.
82. Id.at 85.
83. ld. at 87.
84. Characteristics of complex adaptive systems as used in the scientific model include: dynamic
states, complicated enmeshed relationships, feedback loops that generate change, emergent, selforganizing behavior, and a sensitivity to small changes resulting in big effects. James Begun et al.,
Health Care Organizations as Complex Adaptive Systems, in ADVANCES iN HEALTH CARE
ORGANIZATION THEORY 253,255-57 (Stephen S.Mick & Mindy E. Wyttenbach eds., 2003).
85. Anderson & McDaniel, supranote 81, at 88.
Implementing Culture Change in Healthcare:Theory and Practice, 15 INT'L J.
86. Tim Scott et al.,
FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 111, 112-13 (2003).
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professional subculture develops in relative isolation without interprofessional mingling until the indoctrination process is complete.87
This separation creates barriers to understanding between
professional groups as to role, language, approaches to patient care,
and professional values. 88 Organizational culture, impacted over time
by the presence of the professional subcultures, further reinforces the
socialization begun during training. 89 As the professions co-mingle
within the organizational culture, opportunities for conflict arise as
values clash. 90 As professionals make decisions based on unshared
assumptions and as communication fails in the face of differing
professional language and goals, adverse patient outcomes can give
rise to conflicts. 91 Additionally, conflicts occur when assumptions
held by members of the various subcultures diverge from the values
of the organization, leading to behaviors that are contrary to these
values and becoming a source of frustration for hospital
administrators.
The philosophies of practice among the various professional
groups are very different and lead to ingrained values and
assumptions within each professional group. Physicians typically
learn a reductionist, "technical rationality" approach to diagnosis and
treatment of individual illnesses, integrating physical data to rule-in
or rule-out a likely cause of the illness.92 Nurses, alternatively, learn a
holistic, patient-centered approach that includes physical, emotional,
and spiritual components of healing.93 Values reinforced during the
nursing education process include patient advocacy and quality of
life. The nurse becomes the coordinator of care, integrating
information and orchestrating treatment activities from the various
members of the treatment team, while incorporating the needs of both
the patient and the family in determining treatment priorities.
Working from these divergent philosophies, it is easy to see the
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

DRINKA & CLARK, supra note 18, at 65-66.
Id. at 69-80; ScoTT ET AL., supra note 9, at 25.
DRINKA & CLARK, supra note 18, at 67.
Id. at 76-78.
Id.
Bottles, supra note 43.
DRINKA & CLARK, supra note 18, at 73.
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challenges associated with communication and identification of
treatment priorities, which often lead to inter-professional tensions
and interpersonal conflicts.
The professions differ significantly in how they view their ability
to work together. Recent studies assessing levels of teamwork and
collaboration reveal that physicians and nurses have quite different
perceptions regarding levels of communication and cooperation. In a
survey of intensive care nurses and physicians, 73% of physicians
believed that collaboration with nurses was high or very high, while
only 33% of nurses in the same units believed that to be true.94 A
study published in 2004 indicates that doctors were satisfied,
significantly more often than nurses, with the inter-professional
cooperation between the two groups. 95 The researchers posited that
the operational definition of cooperation is quite different for the two
groups. 96 Physician satisfaction with the level of cooperation
depended mostly on their feeling that all professions were working
together toward the same goals for the patients. 97 Nursing satisfaction
was more dependent upon their overall job satisfaction." According
to the researchers, for physicians, "good co-operation means having
their therapeutic decisions effectively implemented and being kept
To [nurses], co-operation does not
informed about their effect ....
only mean communicating medical observations or administering
medication, but also being appreciated for their independent
contributions to the healing process." 99 In a 2001 study looking at
factors considered core to clinicians' identity, physicians "regarded
inequalities of power as natural, necessary and beneficial."' 0'0 Nursing
clinicians, not surprisingly, rejected this view. 10 1 In addition, doctors

94. Eric J. Thomas et al., DiscrepantAttitudes About Teamwork Among Critical Care Nurses and
Physicians,31 CRITICAL CARE MED. 956, 957 (2003).
95. Unni Krogstad et al., Doctor and Nurse Perception of Inter-Professional Co-Operation in
Hospitals, 16 INT'L J. FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 491,493 (2004).
96. Id. at 494-96.
97. Id. at 496.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Degeling, supra note 15, at 41.
101. Id. at 38.
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who
viewed clinical work as individualistic, as compared to nurses,
02
1
undertaking.
collective
a
as
considered clinical work more
The professions also differ in their perceptions and approaches to
conflict. An intensive care study found that physicians were less
likely than nurses to report inappropriately resolved disagreements,
while nurses indicated that they believed physicians poorly received
their input and that it was difficult to assert themselves. 103 A 2001
study looked at how hospital professionals handle cooperational
conflicts.'°4 The researchers' findings indicate that physicians tolerate
more stress and disagreement than members of other professional
groups before recognizing a conflict. 10 5 It is unclear whether this is a
tendency, or an insensitivity to a
coping technique, an avoidance
06
collaborative environment.'
The subculture of non-clinical (i.e., lay) managers is another group
with specific beliefs that impact conflict resolution.01 7 A 2001 study
found that lay managers oppose the "medical ascendancy model of
clinical unit management" and support hierarchical models for
managing clinical work processes-in direct opposition to the
responses of physician and nurse clinicians.10 8 This finding helps
explain the difficulties associated with resolving conflicts arising
from resource allocation decisions, with attempts to implement
standardized clinical care guidelines, and with efforts to advance
quality reforms-managerial actions that risk running counter to
desires for professional autonomy. It is understandable how this
mixture of different world views can contribute to ongoing, recurring
clinical conflicts.
Communication styles by members of the groups also vary,
particularly in conflict situations. In non-conflict situations, the

102. Id. at 39, 42-43.
103. Thomas et al., supranote 94, at 957-58.
104. Morton Skjorshammer, Co-Operationand Conflict in Hospitals: InterprofessionalDifferences in
Perceptionand Managementof Conflicts, 15 J. INTERPROFESSIONAL CARE 9, 9-12 (2001).
105. IdatlO-11.
106. Id. at9-12.
107. Lay managers refer to those professionals who are trained in business or in other non-clinical
disciplines and who have supervisory responsibilities for clinical operations.
108. Degeling, supra note 15, at 41-42.
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communication style of nurses and social workers is nurturing;
however, in conflict situations, the communication style of nurses is
more like that of physicians-avoidant. 10 9 Of the five ThomasKilman modes of communication, nurses are predominantly avoidant,
with compromising as the second most common style. 110 Given
nurses' collectivist view of clinical work, this avoidance tendency
may reflect an approach to conflict in which the focus on preserving
relationships within the group take precedence over the needs of the
individual.' 11
Understanding the differing perceptions of the existence and
response to conflict may give insight into the resistance toward
collaborative dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly within an
environment containing differing perceptions regarding power
imbalances and containing opposing approaches to professional
practice (i.e., individualistic vs. collective). In light of these broad
differences in interests and values, it is apparent that there is a strong
need for interest-based processes that address the deeper assumptions
driving behaviors. However, given the insular nature of clinical
training and professionally imposed hierarchies, awareness of nonhierarchical (i.e., non-power-based) methods for addressing disputes
is quite low. There is a strong tendency to cling to respect for
authority and to deference to those with positional authority as the
ones responsible for dealing with conflict. It is difficult to know if
this is a symptom of avoidant behavior or a reflection of beliefs
concerning the role of authority. In light of the deeply ingrained
problem-solving drive of clinical professionals, utilization of a
facilitated process may even feel like a sign of failure, especially if
what appear to be simple problems keep recurring and remain
"unsolvable." This concept is particularly poignant in light of the
need for and valuing of "remaining in control."

109. DRINKA & CLARK, supra note 18, at 80.
110. Patricia E.B. Valentine, A Gender Perspective on Conflict Management Strategies of Nurses, 33
J. NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 69,69-74 (2001).
111. Degeling, supra note 15, at 39.
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UNCOVERING ASSUMPTIONS-S OME CLUES INTO THE BELIEFS OF

HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS

A look at some of the perceptions and behaviors of these
subcultures sheds light on just how different the clinical professions
really are. It is not yet clear what assumptions are driving some of
these behaviors. Examining the determination of status, authority,
and rewards within an organization or group can provide some
insight.'12 An example of each follows.
A. Rewards
In an article examining barriers to learning within health care
organizations, the authors offer an anecdotal story which
demonstrates how nurses reward their peers. Its authors observed that
problem-solving happens locally, without regard for the impact of the
solution on the system as a whole. In the story, when faced with a
repeated shortage of linen, nightshift nurses arranged for a taxi cab
driver to go to another hospital in town, obtain linens, and deliver the
linens. 113 Clinicians highly reward problem-solving to meet the
immediate needs of patients, particularly in the face of broken
systems that do not ensure resources are available when they are
necessary. 14 This suggests that independent problem-solving is an
underlying assumption among nurses that enables nurses to complete
their work effectively.
B. Status andAuthority
Novice clinicians must often learn appropriate professional
behavior by watching and mimicking more senior clinicians. After
observing 128 hours of professional interactions in an operating
room, one commentator determined that, in response to tension
112. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 44-47.
113. Anita L. Tucker & Amy C. Edmondson, Why Hospitals Don't Learn from Failures:
Organizationaland PsychologicalDynamics That Inhibit System Change 8, 45 CAL. MGMT. REV. 55
(2003).
114. See generally Beaudoin & Edgar, supra note 47, at 106
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within the surgical team, novices either mimic their teacher's style, or
posture and exhibit withdrawal from the situation. 1 5 The researchers
described a situation in which a new physician observes an
experienced physician.1 6 The experienced physician rapidly
demands additional equipment despite available unused equipment
close at hand and the circulating nurse responds promptly with the
equipment-visibly irritated by the demands. 117 When a novice
physician imitates the observed behavior and asks for additional
equipment, the nurse responds: "Who's asking for another monitor?..
' 8
Not Dr. NEW Fellow? He's not requesting anything, is he?" "1
Laughter throughout the team followed the exchange." 9 The novice
clinician received a public lesson about status and appropriate
behavior across the professional groups, wherein, despite her
irritation, the nurse tolerated the frequent requests of the staff surgeon
because of the status and authority acquired through the surgeon's
experience. 120 Interestingly, in this example, a senior resident tries to
divert the novice's requests to prevent the chastisement. 21 Actual
practice is replete with examples of how novice practitioners learn to
respect and earn clinical status. The pecking order that emerges
within and across the professional groups reflects the high value
afforded experience and expertise.
A disconnect between espoused values and behaviors indicates
there are deeper cultural assumptions affecting decision-making and
how people work together. 122 A look at how organizations approach
their commitment to patient safety gives some insight into what this
disconnect looks like in practical terms. Since the release of the
Institute of Medicine report, To Err is Human, the public has
increasingly focused on patient safety. 123 Many hospitals have put
-

115. Lorelei Lingard etal., Team Communications in the Operating Room: Talk Patterns, Sites of
Tension, andImplicationsforNovices, 77 AcAD. MED. 232, 234-35 (2002).
116. Id.at 236.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Lingard et al., supra note 115, at 236.
122. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 19.
123. See TO ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 28.
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safety into their marketing materials and mission statements, and
accrediting organizations have developed clear goals for improving
safety. 124 There is much agreement that the health system should be
safer and that safety is a top value among organizations and
practitioners. However, a look at perceptions and practices within the
industry indicates that the stated value does not always match the
behavior. In a 2004 survey of hospital CEOs, only 16% indicated that
patient safety was one of their top three concerns. 125 Additionally, a
2004 survey of 1700 intensive care unit nurses, physicians, clinical
staff, and administrators revealed that:
"eighty-four percent of physicians and sixty-two percent of nurses
and other clinical care providers see some number of their coworkers
taking shortcuts that could be dangerous to patients;"
"eighty-one percent of physicians and fifty-three percent of nurses
and other clinical care providers have concerns about the competency
of some nurse or other clinical care provider they work with;" and
"77% of nurses and other clinical-care providers work with some
who are condescending, insulting, or rude [and] 33% work with a few
who are verbally abusive-[persons who] yell, shout, swear, or name
126
call."
Despite the obvious implications for safety, the survey indicates
that direct communication with these co-workers regarding the
concerns is quite limited:
Among physician respondents, "81% [were] concerned about a
nurse's or other clinical-care provider's competence," and "8% [had]
spoken with this person and shared their full concerns." Also, "68%
[were] concerned about a physician's competence," but "less than 1%
127
[had] spoken with this physician and shared their full concerns."

124. See Sample Outlinefor a Patient Safety Plan, Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations, at http://www.jcaho.org/accredited+organizations/patient+safety/plan+outlinermdex.htm
(last visited Apr. 16, 2005).
125. Top Issues Confronting Hospitals: 2004, American College of Healthcare Executives, at
http://www.ache.org/PUBS/Research/ceoissues.cfin (last visited Apr. 16, 2005).
126. DAVID MAXFIELD ET AL., SILENCE KILLS: THE SEVEN CRUCIAL CONVERSATIONS FOR
HEALTHCARE
4-5
(2005),
available
at
http://www.aacn.org/aacn/pubpolcy.nsf/Files/SilenceKills/$file/SilenceKills.pdf.
127. Id.at 11.
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Among nurse respondents, "75% [were] concerned about a peer's
poor teamwork," and 69 % indicated "the problem with this peer had
gone on for a year or more." 128 However, only "16% [had] spoken
with this peer and shared their full concerns," and concerns about
competence of another nurse were brought to that person's attention
by staff nurses only 3% of the time and by supervisors only 16% of
the time.

129

Statements suggesting why respondents did not discuss their
concerns with their colleagues reveal that they found it "difficult" or
"impossible to confront," that they believed it was "not their job,"
30
and that they believed the conversation would not "do any good.'
In fact, anecdotal reports within the survey's focus groups indicate
that not only is there avoidance of direct communication but that
there are elaborate "work-arounds" to avoid the confrontation as seen
in the following situations described by the focus groups:
"A group of eight anesthesiologists agree a peer is dangerously
incompetent, but they don't confront him. Instead, they go to
great efforts to schedule surgeries for the sickest babies at times
when he is not on duty. This problem has persisted for over five
years.''
"A group of nurses describe a peer as careless and inattentive.
Instead of confronting her, they double check her worksometimes running in to patient rooms to retake a blood pressure
or redo a safety check. They've "worked around" this nurse's
weaknesses for over a year. The nurses resent her, but never talk
to her about their concerns. Nor do any of the doctors who also
32
avoid and compensate for her."'

128.
129.
130,
131.
132.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 10.
Id. at2.
MAXFIELD ET AL., supra note 126, at 2.
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What are the professional cultural assumptions that are so strong
that they override obvious interventions that would improve safety
and prevent harm to patients? What is the impact of mixed messages
resulting from the disconnection between espoused values and
professional behaviors? This ongoing dichotomy between
organizational values and actual practices can contribute to general
mistrust and breakdowns in working relationships as people struggle
to make sense of the environment and come to believe what they see
rather than what they hear. Attempts by leaders to foster safer
practices by instituting changes may meet great resistance because
these assumptions take silent precedence over mandates for change,
even if those changes are rational. Response to this resistance by
organizational leaders can involve coercive actions-like removal of
block time for surgeons--or making one professional group
responsible for policing another group's compliance-such as
requiring nurses to monitor physician compliance, thereby
functionally blocking collaborative practice. 133 In health care,
resistance may contribute not just to conflicts but may lead to harm
by creating a barrier to implementing recommended safety
practices. 134
The behaviors and reports by health care professionals described
above begin to paint a picture of the professional subcultures as well
as the culture of health care organizations generally. However,
observing behaviors does not reveal underlying assumptions
motivating those behaviors. Identifying these assumptions can shed
light on what drives behaviors.' 35 It is necessary to uncover these
deeper assumptions before any individual or group can decide on
different behavior choices that may open the door for resolution of
recurring or intractable conflicts.

133. Barbara LeTourneau, Physicians and Nurses: Friends or Foes?, 49 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 12,
14(2004).
134. Degeling, supranote 15, at 42-43.
135. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 25.
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V. ASSUMPTIONS WITHIN PROFESSIONAL SUBCULTURES

"There is perhaps nothing as powerful for' 36
defining, enriching, and
identity."'
over
conflict
as
identity
deepening
Health care professionals' behavior to conceal information that
could prevent future patient harm appears to contradict their
professional values of patient advocacy and to "do no harm,"
indicating that deeper assumptions motivate these behaviors.
Physicians tend to take a "pathologized view of the world" in that
137
their training taught them to look for problems or deficiencies.
This viewpoint is very mechanistic and implies the existence of a
causal link to every problem. The goal is to seek out and correct the
cause. This forms the basis for the process of differential diagnosis,
in which physicians link a set of symptoms (effects) to potential
causes and rule those causes in or out to make an accurate clinical
diagnosis. Unsurprisingly, a common response to the application of
this linear, problem-solving approach to treatment errors or delivery
of care failures is to seek fault in someone's actions as the cause of
the failure.
Additionally, within the culture of health care lies the highly
valued and rewarded belief in "being in control."' 138 In health care's
complex and unpredictable environment, control is never attainable.
However, clinicians and leaders' expectation of control remains
strong. 139 This expectation reinforces deeply held assumptions of
individual accountability, of the physician as solely or primarily
responsible for the quality of care, and of individualistic and
competitive work styles as beneficial.140 The concept of the physician
as the team leader who works autonomously and who is solely
responsible for the quality of care that a patient receives is welldeveloped during medical school and residency. 141 Acknowledging
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

(1999).

ROTHMAN, supra note 58, at 34.
Suchman, supranote55, at 44.
Id.
Id.
See Degeling, supra note 15, at 42-43.
Robert Michels, Medical Education and Managed Care, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 959, 960
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that one's actions may have contributed to harm could trigger what
Suchman referred to as "the imposter syndrome"-the fear that
someone will find out that one lost control.' 42 The need to maintain
the illusion contributes to other unsafe behaviors, such as failure to
ask for help, over-commitment to workload, and neglect of personal
health.' 43 Patients have adopted assumptions regarding physician
responsibility as well. According to a 2002 survey of patients and
physicians, "seventy percent or more of both groups of respondents
who reported experience with an error assigned 'a lot' of
responsibility to the physicians involved," and 55% of patients and
physicians chose "mistakes made by health professionals.

.

. "[as] a

more important cause" of medical error than mistakes made by health
care institutions.1 44 The presence of these underlying assumptions
may explain why, even in the face of data supporting human factors
and latent system errors as inherent contributors to errors and direct
experience with colleagues who demonstrate unsafe practices, there
is still underreporting of information that could be beneficial for
improving outcomes. With both health care professionals and patients
holding assumptions that create unrealistic demands for control and
perfection, it is clear that there will need to be fundamental changes
in the culture of health care before open reporting and systems-based
error correction models will be effective. 145 Finding techniques to
uncover assumptions and test their validity against more recent
environmental changes may help remove some of the resistance to
change and assist the various groups to work more productively
together.

142. Suchman, supra note 55, at 44 (citing K. Henning, et al., Perfectionism, The Imposter
Phenomenon and Psychological Adjustment in Medical, Dental, Nursing and Pharmacy Students, 32
MED. EDUC. 456 (1998)).
143. Suchman, supra note 55, at 44.
144. Robert J.Blendon et al., Patient Safety: Views of PracticingPhysicians and the Public on
Medical Errors,347 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1933, 1934-35 (2002).
145. Donna B. Jeffe etal., Using Focus Groups to UnderstandPhysicians'andNurses' Perspectives
on ErrorReporting in Hospitals,30 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY & SAFETY 471 (2004).
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VI. USING ADR To ADDRESS CULTURE-BASED CONFLICTS IN

HEALTH CARE

There is much opportunity for integrating the principles of dispute
resolution into the delivery of health services. Given the
environment's complexity and the impact of professional culture, the
ADR community will need to consider how to modify itself to meet
this unique industry's needs. A beginning point would be to
reconsider the concept of ADR as currently packaged. Non-litigation
alternatives include a mix of power-based and interest-based
processes. Power-based processes may settle terms of a dispute but
will not address the causes leading to the conflict or lead to stable
behavior changes. In addition, the professional culture of those
providing arbitration or heavily evaluative processes may be in direct
conflict with the professional culture of those experiencing the
conflict. Legal professionals have their own cultural assumptions and
values that may not mesh with those of the health care sector.
Interest-based processes are more amenable to addressing culture
issues than power-based processes, but for health care conflicts, as
currently designed they may be too time intensive or too far removed
from where they can do the most good, such as in the clinical setting.
Additionally, approaches that only address more superficial interests
without taking into consideration cultural assumptions or interactions
between organizational and professional cultures may be ineffective
and could worsen conflicts or leave the participants even more
frustrated. 146 Finding effective ways for integrating the best of
interest-based conflict resolution with additional techniques for
uncovering cultural and identity needs may help move health care
organizations toward more collaborative cultures and may improve
the work environment for thousands of health professionals. The
following subsections introduce some things to consider in
redesigning conflict management services for health care
organizations.

146. ROTHMAN, supra note 58, at 9.
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A. Time Considerations
The health care environment operates around the clock, allowing
very little time for meeting together. Due to the over-commitment of
health care workers, scheduling challenges are tremendous and take
much attention and many resources. Techniques for working within
professionals' time constraints are essential. Mediators may need to
schedule frequent facilitated meetings, may need to schedule them for
shorter periods of time, and may need hold them very early in the
morning, in the middle of the night, or on weekends. Additionally,
those working in health care tend to focus on solutions immediately
and frequently exhibit "process intolerance," creating a need for
process structures that balance the time constraints with the
assessment steps necessary before the group can consider any
solutions.
B. Power Imbalances
Power imbalances intertwined within health care disputes depend
on professional group membership, level of experience, gender,
positional power, market power, union affiliation, and many other
variables. Dispute resolution processes must recognize these
imbalances and consider ways to foster open communication without
jeopardizing individuals who may make themselves vulnerable to
retaliation or scapegoating due to the shared information. Subtle
methods of retaliation are common within health care culture and fear
of this retaliation inhibits health care professionals from addressing
conflicts themselves. Examples of these actions include:
discontinuance of patient referrals, inappropriate assignments of
patients, failure to provide backup for heavy workloads, and
exclusion from committees and other political forums.
C. Language
Health care organizations, like any specialized industry, have their
own language. Within the organizations, there are further language
challenges in communicating with clinicians whose livelihood and
professional affiliation rest on their knowledge of the special
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language of medicine. With the time constraints mentioned, it is
difficult for those doing dispute resolution to become proficient in
medical jargon, common practices, and technical nuances within the
process itself. Stopping the process frequently for clarification on
common medical terms may give health care professionals the
impression of a lack of competence given the strong tie between
competence and clinical expertise. For clinical conflict management,
process modification may entail integration of clinical expertise into
the dispute resolution team in order to improve comprehension and
time management and in order to overcome initial credibility barriers
set by participants in the process.
D. Interdependencies
With the complexity of health care organizations, it will be a rare
conflict that does not involve multiple groups, departments, or
facilities. Communication structures across these entities are not
well-developed, and identifying effective ways to limit the scope of
the conflict management intervention without omitting key
stakeholders is a challenge.
E. Money
The focus on cost containment in health care is alive and strong.
Often, organizational leaders will forego dispute resolution
interventions in the early stages of a dispute, leading to more
expensive interventions once the parties have formed stronger
positions. Additionally, the risk of having only a limited amount of
time with the participants due to budget constraints limits the
effectiveness of any process and may require ethical decisions by
consultants as to whether it is appropriate to begin an intervention at
all or to take an intervention in a direction that may open old wounds
and risk discontinuing before addressing the deeper issues.
Additionally, different professional groups have different levels of
access to funds; nursing groups and social workers have less money
available than physicians for hiring consultants but may have a
greater understanding of the benefits of a collaborative process.
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Adjusting reimbursement expectations to the realities of resource
availability can improve access and increase the likelihood that more
complete interventions may be available.
F. Autonomy
Interest-based processes such as mediation strongly promote the
principle of participant autonomy. This is congruent with some health
care professionals' desire for autonomy. Despite this congruence,
many health care professionals look to leaders to make decisions as
to who is right or wrong in conflict situations and may be
uncomfortable with the personal responsibility built in to facilitative
processes. Managing expectations as to mediation benefits and the
decision-making process is essential when working with health care
groups, and a facilitator may need to repeat these expectations
throughout the process.
G. Reputation andIdentity
Conflict management processes must respect the need for
maintaining reputation within the organization while addressing
dysfunctional behaviors that may be contributing to the conflict.
Reputation correlates to status in health care and can be difficult to
regain once damaged. Health care professionals have strong identity
ties to their profession, and facilitators' suggestions to acknowledge
the value of other professional groups' contributions may meet with
strong resistance, suggesting identity conflicts wherein acceptance of
the value of "other" appears to diminish the value of self. Techniques
designed to address identity conflicts may be helpful in facilitating
147
inter-professional disputes.
H. Patients
Behind most clinical conflicts lies a patient who has faced or faces
potential harm. This is always in the minds of those working in health
147. Id. at 8.
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care and can be a strong basis for finding initial common ground. It
can also heighten clinicians' fears that their license is at risk, that
they will face lawsuits, or that they will cause harm when team
functioning breaks down. The high levels of emotion that accompany
these fears make health care disputes emotionally charged and make
addressing these fears an inherent part of the process. Additionally,
health care organizations are just beginning to incorporate patients
into interest-based processes involving quality of care. Patients and
families' lack of access to the process because of liability fears is a
serious barrier to effective resolution of disputes involving this
important group of stakeholders. National organizations are just now
putting forward recommendations for liability system improvements
to increase access to broader alternatives for resolving quality of care
48

disputes. 1

I. Data
Health care professionals, particularly physicians, are very datadriven, and finding ways to collect data on best practices, improved
outcomes, and cost savings associated with conflict management
interventions will enhance dispute resolution professionals' ability to
market services to health care clients. This data will also provide
information to the dispute resolution industry as to what works well.
Making use of pilot projects, data collection within mediation
programs, and participant surveys can provide some initial
foundation for developing the field and improving the receptiveness
49

of health professionals. 1
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J. Skills
Until very recently, communication and conflict resolution skills
were not a part of clinicians and health care administrators'
professional training. Organizations need to modify their training and
professional curricula to address the barrier caused by the lack of
ability to address conflicts directly. Recent mandates by the
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, the
Commission on Accreditation of Health care Management Education,
and the American Nurses Association indicate that these
competencies will be compulsory for future students; however, given
the strong reliance on modeling and mimicry common in health care
training, it will be important to expand access to training to those
50
who are already working and training others.'
K. Expanding the Tool Box
Typically, ADR professionals limit the process tools they
provide-arbitration, mediation, facilitation, and training. Expansion
of services to include other process tools-such as appreciative
inquiry, dialogue, world caf6 (i.e., a network of small conversations
in large group settings to facilitate discussion), transformational
interviewing, and narrative inquiry---can enhance flexibility and
provide access to methods for uncovering underlying assumptions
that are motivating behaviors. Additionally, utilizing tools designed

150. The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education has recently begun to require that all
U.S. residency programs provide training in "interpersonal and professional communication skills."
ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MED. EDUC., COMMON PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 4 (2004),
available at http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/dutyHours/dhdutyHoursCommonPR.pdf. In Fall 2003,
the Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Management Education (formerly the Accrediting
Commission of Education for Health Services Administration), modified its criteria for accrediting
postgraduate programs in health administration to include the addition of education in "conflict and
change management skills, and written and oral communications skills." Accreditation Criteria,
Commission
on
Accreditation
of
Healthcare
Management
Education,
http://www.cahmeweb.org/criteria.htm (last modified Mar. 7, 2005). The Nursing Code of Ethics,
revised and adopted by the American Nurses Association in 2001, states: "The nurse maintains
compassionate and caring relationships with colleagues and others with a commitment to the fair
treatment of individuals, to integrity-preserving compromise, and to resolving conflict." AMERICAN
NURSES ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS FOR NURSES WITH INTERPRETWE STATEMENTS 1.5 (2001),
available at http://www.ana.org/ethics/code/protected-nwcoe303.htm
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to assess culture-such as "cultural consensus analysis," "competing
values framework," and "culture inventories" as part of conflict
assessments-may provide better information for consultants and
participants. 15 1 Redefining and modifying the offered services to
meet the needs of the health care industry can expand the usefulness
of ADR and improve access to a much-needed service for those
struggling within health care organizations.
CONCLUSION

Not all conflicts are culture-based; however, in the face of
intractable or chronic conflict situations that exhibit identifiable
patterns across organizations and professional groups, it is worth
considering the impact of culture and how to address the levels of
culture as part of the conflict management process. The challenges of
addressing organizational culture and the complex needs of
professional groups should not deter those providing dispute
resolution services from advancing the development of services for
the health care industry, particularly given the impact of conflict and
communication breakdowns on safe outcomes for patients. Current
research into patient safety and quality of care indicates that finding
effective methods for managing these conflicts is a necessary step
toward reducing preventable death and injury to patients during the
course of treatment. This alone is a reason for ADR professionals to
look for ways to improve access to services that will foster
collaborative cultures as a means for reducing the risk of harm to
those entering the health care system. Additionally, improving the
work lives of those who dedicate themselves to caring for others can
improve morale, increase retention, impact the availability of future
health care professionals, and return hope to an industry seeking
answers to complex problems. The ADR community has much to
offer and has an important role to play in the creation of safer healing
environments.

151. Smith et al., supranote 23, at 516; Scorr

ET AL.,

supra note 9, at 63-65.

